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Abstract
Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Since the
unreviewed movies tend to be below average in quality, this practice provides a useful setting
in which to test models of limited strategic thinking: Do moviegoers seem to realize that no
review is a sign of low quality? A companion paper showed that in a set of all widely released
movies 2000–09, cold opening produces a significant 20–30% increase in domestic box office
revenue, which is consistent with moviegoers overestimating quality of unreviewed movies
(perhaps due to limited strategic thinking). This paper reviews those findings and provides two
models to analyze this data, an equilibrium model and a behavioral cognitive hierarchy (CH)
model that allows for differing levels of strategic thinking between moviegoers and movie
studios. The behavioral model fits the data better, as moviegoer parameters are relatively
close to those observed in experimental subjects. These results suggests that limited strategic
thinking may be a better explanation for naı¨ve moviegoer behavior than equilibrium reasoning
is.
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1 Introduction
Game theory has sometimes been criticized as a descriptive model of business practice, or a source
of normative advice, on the grounds that most analysis assumes people forecast accurately what
others will do, and choose best responses given their accurate (equilibrium) forecasts. Recently,
models have been developed which allow plausible limits on strategic thinking. These models are
particularly useful because their basic principles can apply to many different games. One class of
models that has been applied to many data sets is a “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) model of levels of
steps of thinking (and its close relative, level-k). These models have been used to explain normal
form games in a wide variety of experimental1 and field settings,2 but the only applications of these
theories to games with private information so far are analyses of auctions.3 This paper explores
the generality of these approaches through the first field application of models of limited strategic
thinking to games with private information.4
The setting we study is Hollywood movies. Movie studios generally show movies to critics
well in advance of the release (so that critics’ reviews can be published or posted before the movie
is shown, and can be quoted in newspaper ads). However, movies are often deliberately made
1See Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Camerer et al. (2004), Crawford and Iriberri (2007a); Crawford et al.
(2010)
2Goldfarb and Yang (2009), apply these models to firm adoption of 56K modems, Goldfarb and Xiao (in press)
study strategic entry of phone companies into new markets and O¨stling et al., (2011) use Swedish lottery choices and
experimental analogues.
3See Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Wang (2006).
4This setting is one example of a more general class of disclosure games in which a seller who knows something
about a product’s quality can choose whether to disclose a signal of its quality or not (see Verrecchia (2001, section 3)
and Fishman and Hagerty (2003) for surveys). These disclosure games have been extensively studied in economics (see
Dranove and Jin, 2010, for an exhaustive listing), but this paper is the first to tie the process of disclosure to models of
limited strategic thinking and estimate them structurally. This paper examines the disclosure process, testing strategic
disclosure as a response of producers to the limited strategic thinking of consumers.
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unavailable to film critics in advance of their initial release, a practice sometimes called “cold
opening.” If moviegoers believe that studios know their movie’s quality (and if some other simpli-
fying assumptions hold, see Brown et al., in press), then rational moviegoers should infer that cold
opened movies are below average in quality.
Anticipating this accurate negative inference by moviegoers, studios should only cold open
the very worst movies. However, this conclusion requires many steps of iterated reasoning (and
many simplifying assumptions). So it is an empirical question whether the equilibrium prediction
fits behavior. If it does not fit well, it is also an empirical question whether neoclassical expla-
nations can explain the data or whether models of limited strategic thinking, initially designed to
explain experimental data as well or better than neoclassical models, fit the studios’ cold-opening
decisions.
A fully rational analysis of simple disclosure games, due originally to Grossman (1981) and
Milgrom (1981), implies that cold opening should not be profitable if some simple assumptions are
met. The argument can be illustrated numerically with a simple example. Suppose movie quality
is uniformly distributed from 0 to 100, moviegoers and studios agree on quality, and firm profits
increase in quality. If studios cold open all movies with quality below a cutoff 50, moviegoers with
rational expectations will infer that the expected quality of a cold opened movie is 25. But then it
would pay to screen all movies with qualities between 26 and 100, and only cold open movies with
qualities 25 or below. More generally, if the studios do not screen movies with qualities below
q∗, the consumers’ conditional expectation if a movie if unscreened is q∗/2, so it pays to screen
movies with qualities q ∈ (q∗/2, 100] rather than just q ∈ (q∗, 100]. The logical conclusion of
iterating this reasoning is that only the worst movies (quality 0) are unscreened. This conclusion
2
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is sometimes called “unravelling.”5 We proceed with the maintained hypothesis that complete
unravelling should occur in theory, if studios and consumers are perfectly rational.
The CH models also proceed through the steps of strategic thinking in the rational unravelling
argument, except that they assume that some fraction of moviegoers end their inference process
after a small number of steps. For example, a 0-level moviegoer thinks that cold opening decisions
are random (they convey no information about quality) and hence infers that the quality of a cold-
opened movie is average. A 1-level studio anticipates that moviegoers think this way and therefore
opens all below-average movies cold, and shows all above-average movies to critics. Higher-
level thinkers iterate more steps in this process. Observed behavior will then be an average of the
predicted behaviors at each of these levels weighted by the fraction of moviegoers and studios who
do various numbers of steps of thinking. (More details of this model are given in section 3).
The data generally do not agree with the standard full disclosure model. Roughly 10% of
the movies in our sample are opened cold (though that fraction has increased sharply in recent
years). Regressions show that cold opening appears to generate a box office premium (compared to
similar-quality movies that are pre-reviewed, and including many other controls). Since box office
returns are strongly correlated with subjective quality (measured by either critic or fan ratings), the
cold opening premium suggests fans think the movie is better than it actually is. We also conclude
that this explanation is consistent with four of five stylized facts in this environment, none of which
can be explained by a neoclassical model.6
5In the most similar theoretical work, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) do provide a model of a disclosure process with
both informed and uninformed consumers, although it does not specifically address limited strategic thinking.
6For example an important observation is that fan ratings of quality are correlated with critic ratings, but are
systematically lower for cold-opened movies. This is consistent with the hypothesis that fans choose movies based
on expected quality, and are disappointed more often in cold-opened movies (presumably because their expectations
were too high).
3
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We then fit a baseline Nash Equilibrium model, similar to Seim (2006), in which studios cold-
open movies when they receive a private idiosyncratic error, and a model using CH, that can be
augmented to allow disequilibrium using two separate CH parameters for moviegoers and stu-
dios.7 Both baseline and CH models have roughly similar estimates for studio choices, since
cold-openings are quite rare as predicted by equilibrium and CH models with high levels of think-
ing (there is less data with actual cold-opening box office to fit the model). However, the baseline
model cannot predict cold-opening premiums from moviegoer choice while the CH model can.
The estimates for moviegoers thinking in the CH model, especially in the period 2000-2005,
are roughly consistent with experimentally observed data. Studios in the later period (2006-2009)
also have lower estimates of perceived steps-of-thinking, suggesting they may be learning to best
respond to moviegoers’ limited rationality.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses data on quality ratings, box-office re-
turns, and control variables, and presents some regression results on the existence of a box-office
premium for movies that are cold opened. Section 3 describes the Bayesian-Nash and CH mod-
els. Section 4 estimates parameters of those models based on studios’ decisions and the box office
revenue. Section 5 concludes and discusses future extensions to management-related research.
2 Data
Much of the data and details of regression conclusions are reported in a companion paper (Brown
et al., in press) so we will summarize those results which are relevant to the analysis of this paper.
7The mismatch between the degree of strategic thinking of moviegoers and studios is not typically observed in
experimental data. However, keep in mind that experiments rarely use mixtures of populations which are more and
less strategically sophisticated, so it is perhaps not surprising that the estimate of studio strategic thinking is very high,
and is much higher than the moviegoer estimates.
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In much of the analysis we will make a distinction between movies from 2000–2005 and 2006–
2009, a distinction that was not made in the companion paper.
The data set is all 1414 movies widely released in more than 600 theaters in the US in their
first weekend, over the decade from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2009. Critic and moviegoer
ratings are both used to measure quality. Metacritic.com normalizes and averages ratings from
over 30 movie critics from newspapers, magazines, and websites. These have a roughly normal
distribution between 0 and 100. For estimation purposes, we use the percentile score of those
ratings so that they are standardized to a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. The metacritic
rating is available for all non-cold-opened movies on the day they are released and is available
on Monday for cold-opened movies. Because these ratings occur so early in a film’s release,
we assume the ratings help determine box office revenue and not vice versa (i.e., critics aren’t
influenced by box office). Other variables (such as, cold opening, box office revenues, movie
genres and ratings, production budgets, and star power ratings) are collected from various data
sources (see appendix).
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables. All these variables were used in a regres-
sion model to test if movies that are cold opened have significantly greater opening weekend and
total US box office revenues. The table also shows separate variable means for the cold-opened
movies. The cold-opened movies are somewhat statistically different in a few dimensions—they
tend to be smaller in budget and theater coverage, have less well-known stars, and over-represent
some genres (e.g., suspense/horror).
Each movie, j, has a standardized metacritic.com rating qj , a dummy variable for whether a
5
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Table 1: Summary statistics for variables.
a. T-tests assume unequal variance. Standard error is the square root of the weighted average of sample variances.
b. For movies that do not have a second actor (e.g., a nature documentary with a narrator). The second star value is
chosen arbitrarily high at 6 billion to represent the effect of no second star.
c. This value is calculated in regard to the Friday of a movie’s “opening weekend.” We follow the industry’s classifi-
cation on opening weekend, and make no decisions ourselves.
d. There are 1414 observations for all variables except 1413 (1251 screened, 162 cold) for metacritic and 1303 (1155
screened, 136 cold) for production budget.
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movie was cold opened, cj (=1 if cold), and a vector Xj of other variables. The model is
log yj = aXj + bqj + dcj + j (1)
where yj is opening weekend or total US box office for movie j in 2005 dollars, standardized using
the CPI index (www.bls.gov). Table 2 shows regression results on logged total box office revenue
and logged opening weekend revenue, respectively.
The point of these initial regressions is not to estimate a full model with endogenous studio
decisions (we will estimate such a model in section 4). Instead, the regression is simply a way
of determining whether there is a difference in the revenue between cold-opened and reviewed
movies. Under the standard equilibrium assumption that all quality information of cold-opened
movies is inferred by logical inference of moviegoers, we should see no difference in revenues,
and the cold-opening coefficient should be zero. If this is the case, it is good evidence for the Nash
unravelling argument, and there is no interesting pattern for the behavioral theories to explain. The
cold-opening coefficients in the first row of table 2 show, that cold opening a movie is positively
correlated with the logarithm of opening weekend and total US box office revenues.8
In this paper the analysis will often be separated over the years 2000-2005 and 2006-2009.
This is because the frequency of cold opening doubled in 2006 and persisted at the same level
through 2009. (In financial economics it is common to break a long period into subperiods to test
for robustness of effects and we adapt that method here as well.) There is no structural change in
the movie industry in 2006 which justifies separating the entire sample into these two periods, but
8Note that this relationship is also found between cold opening and opening weekend and total US box office (no
logarithm). So this relationship is not just a result of the functional form of the regression.
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Table 2: Regressions on box office revenues (in millions).
All regressions include a constant term. Tables displaying coefficients for all regressors are available in the appendix.
a. Release date timing variables are “year,” “days released before friday,” “opening weekend continues after sunday,”
“months released earlier in a foreign country,” and “summer open.”
8
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there is a statistical jump in the percentage of cold openings in that year. In our first regressions, it
is apparent that the cold-opening premium is greater and more significant over the later years 2006–
2009 than the earlier years 2000-2005. However, this result could be due to the small number of
cold openings in the earlier period (43 of 778 movies, about 6%) compared to the later period (93
of 525 movies, about 18%).
If the regression model is taken literally, these coefficients suggest that cold opening a movie
increases its revenue from 6-35%.9 However, we caution the reader in such an immediate inter-
pretation of these results because there is no evidence that the relationship is causal. For instance,
a critically-acclaimed movie with a high metacritic score would probably not make more revenue
if it were cold opened. Selection of particular types of movies which benefit from cold opening is
likely to be contributing to the regression results. Cold-opened movies all have metacritic scores
under 67 and have a mean of 30. We do not have data for high-quality movies that are cold opened,
since studios never make this choice. We account for the effect of this selection for cold opening
using propensity matching in this section and later in our structural model (sections 3 and 4).
Propensity score matching techniques involve running a logistic regression to determine which
other variables are the most associated with a cold-opening (see appendix) these predicted cold
probabilities can be used to estimate which movies were the most likely to be cold opened. Running
weighted regressions with these values, we can ignore movies that are very unlikely to be cold
opened and match movies that were and were not cold opened but had similar propensities. Table
3 shows the results of three types of propensity score matching for weekend and cumulative US
box office data.
9For the average gross of a cold-opened movie, $25 million, this is roughly $1.5–8.75 million of box office revenue.
9
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Table 3: Propensity score matching results for logged US cumulative and weekend box office,
2000–2009 movies.
Cold opening is the treatment variable. A logit regression including all 23 variables and a constant (see appendix for
the regression) was used to generate propensity scores. All specifications are over the area of common support.
10
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The propensity score matching results find that cold opening is correlated with a 35-55% pos-
itive increase in revenue for US opening weekend and cumulative box office. This result suggests
a poor-quality movie could increase its revenue by one-third to one-half by cold opening. Near-
est neighbor matching—a technique that matches each cold-opened movie (j) with the regular
released movie that has the closest propensity (to j) to have been cold opened—finds the high-
est positive correlation of 50%. Other matching techniques that use more movies (596 vs. 72),
but weigh each film differently, predict a lower value for the cold-opening premium (30%–40%).
Taken together, these results suggest that the positive cold-opening premium is not a result of com-
paring cold-opened movies to larger, blockbuster movies that would never be cold opened, since
the propensity of these large movies is low and they are ignored and receive low weight. Instead,
the better differential performance of cold-opened movies compared to their equally poor quality
screened-for-critics, counterparts is associated with the cold-opening premium.
However, there is further evidence to suggest the cold-opening premium was not as pronounced
during 2000-2005 as it is in 2006–2009. When these propensity score matching techniques are
used on the two specific periods, 2000–2005 and 2006–2009, separately, the coefficient for the
cold-opening premium in the first period is insignificant (and negative in sign, see appendix). This
provides more evidence of a regime shift after 2005 in the profitability of cold-opened movies, or
it may be due to other factors. Nonetheless, the overall result on the profitability of cold-opened
movies is strong: there is a pronounced “cold-opening” premium in the data in the entire sample,
using both regression and propensity matching.
11
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2.1 Five Stylized Facts about Cold Openings
Our companion paper, Brown et al. (in press), notes five main stylized facts about cold openings
that any explanation for cold-opening must explain. That paper argues that other explanations
such as moviegoers not learning about reviews, angry critics and consumer-critic differences, are
unlikely to explain all five facts. The box office premium could be due to an omitted variable that
is correlated with the decision to cold open, a possibility which is difficult to rule out. Interviews
with industry executives did not suggest any such variable. A promising candidate variable is an
unusually good print ad or movie trailer that makes an awful movie look great. Studios should
spend extra on marketing to promote such movies if they cold open them. However, the interaction
between (demeaned) marketing budget and cold opening dummy has a negative and highly signif-
icant effect on box office in both time periods (the full-sample coefficient is −0.276, t = −3.46).
Thus, unusually expensive marketing is associated with lower cold-opening box office, which is
inconsistent with a “great trailer” type of omitted variable explanation.
We do not go into details of other explanations here (see Brown et al., in press). Instead we
note that the standard Nash model cannot explain any of these facts, but an extended version of the
CH model has an explanation for all five. The facts are:
1. There is an apparent correlation between cold opening and US box office revenue.
2. The correlation is very similar whether quality ratings are derived from critics (metacritic)
or from fans who saw the movie (IMDB).
3. The correlation is less pronounced in non-US markets, especially the foreign language mar-
ket Mexico, where releases are typically later, after US reviews are available.
12
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Figure 1: Percent of widely-released movies cold opened by year, 2000–2009
4. IMDB fan ratings are about 0.5 points lower (on a 10-point scale) for cold-opened movies
than for comparable-quality movies that were not cold opened, suggesting fans are disap-
pointed.
5. Cold openings are rare overall, but are increasingly frequent over the years in the sample (as
shown in figure 1).
The standard neoclassical model cannot easily explain any one of these five facts. It does not
predict a cold-opening premium (fact 1 and 2). It does not predict differential performance of cold-
openings in other markets, since quality information should be correctly inferred in all markets
(fact 3). It does not explain why cold-opened movies have lower IMDB fan ratings (fact 4). Since
it predicts cold-openings should not happen, or should only happen by studio idiosyncratic error,
it does not predict why they should be more frequent in the second part of the data set (fact 5).
A CH model can provide plausible explanations for the first four facts, and the conclusions of
13
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experiments that inspired the CH model can provide an explanation for fact 5. Cold-openings gen-
erate a box-office premium due to the limited strategic thinking of moviegoers in non-disclosure,
as they believe cold-opened movies have higher quality than in actuality (facts 1 and 2). In foreign
markets where quality information is already known, cold-openings do not have this premium as
moviegoers infer quality correctly (fact 3). More moviegoers go to cold-openings than if the movie
had been screened for critics, because they infer quality incorrectly, therefore the average fan rating
of cold-opened movies will be lower than screened movies (fact 4).10
Fact 5 is that the rate of cold opening goes up over time. The baseline model explanation of
this fact is that idiosyncratic error is going up over time, which is unlikely. However, the CH
model does not have an immediate explanation of the rate of increase either. Keep in mind that CH
models were initially developed to explain “pre-equilibrated” behavior in one-shot games (and to
supply initial conditions for learning models). They may or may not have much explanatory power
in settings like this, in which studios and moviegoers make a few decisions a year over ten years.
Our explanation is that early in the sample, studios underestimated how naı¨ve moviegoers could
be (evidenced by the very high estimates of strategic sophistication in 2000-2005, see section 4 for
these estimations). While moviegoers learned slowly, studios learned more quickly after noticing
that cold opened movies often did fine at the box office despite no reviews (or, in the CH approach,
because there were no reviews). This asymmetry in learning is consistent with the rise in cold
openings over time, but there may well be other explanations that are not incorporated in either
10For an explanatory example, consider the moviegoer who overestimates a movie’s quality based on strategic
naı¨vete´. Suppose that if he knew the movie’s true quality, or knew that it was cold opened and inferred correctly its
lower quality, he would not see it in theaters. This type of moviegoer is present in the audience of cold-opened movies
but does not go to movies screened for critics. Thus IMDB ratings for cold-opened movies are lower, all else being
equal, because these moviegoers bring down their ratings, but not for movies screened for critics. By analogy, imagine
an expensive restaurant that posts a menu online but does not list prices. If the highest-priced restaurants withhold
prices, and naı¨ve diners do not infer that relation, they will always be complaining about the surprisingly expensive
prices at the restaurants they go to that did not post a menu.
14
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equilibrium or CH models.
3 The General Model
The initial regressions in Section 2 were not designed to understand the endogenous choice of
studios to cold open and the likely reactions of moviegoers. Instead, we create a structural model
of movie viewing and studio choice where moviegoers choose whether to see a movie and studios
choose whether to screen the movie for critics. Our aim is to create a model that can be analyzed
with box office data and studio choice, in which each side simultaneously maximizes utility and
profit respectively, but also a model that we may augment to allow estimation of parameters of
limited strategic thinking concerning beliefs. To ensure that we can calculate equilibrium strategies
for moviegoers and consumers this model is static. However, we will examine the model over two
different time periods to account for the sudden and sustained increase in cold opening at the end
of our dataset (i.e., 2000-2005 and 2006-2009, see figure 1).
Formally, let movie j have characteristics Xj that are known to the studio and moviegoers.
We assume that studios know the quality of their movie, qj and then choose whether to open cold
(cj = 1) or to screen for critics in advance (cj = 0). Moviegoers do not know qj , and form a belief
Em(qj|cj, Xj) that depends on a movie’s characteristics Xj and whether it was cold opened cj .11
To model moviegoer utility functions and studio profit functions, we use an approach similar
to Seim (2006) who examined the equilibrium entry decision in the video rental market of mul-
tiple firms. While her paper examined an equilibrium of homogenous firms, our paper examines
11It is not crucial that moviegoers literally know whether a movie has been cold-opened or not (e.g., surveys are
likely to show that many moviegoers do not know). The essential assumption for analysis is that beliefs are approxi-
mately accurate for pre-reviewed movies and formed based on some different behavioral assumption for cold-opened
movies.
15
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the equilibrium between moviegoers and studios who have different objective functions.12 Movie-
goers form utility estimates of a given movie based upon its characteristics and expected quality,
subtracting the ticket price, γ.
U(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − γ + j (2)
The term j represents moviegoers’ idiosyncratic preferences over movie j. Similar to Seim (2006)
we assume this term is private information known to the moviegoer and independently and iden-
tically distributed from a logisitic distribution (e.g., McFadden, 1974). We define the opportunity
utility of not going to the movies as zero.13 The probability that the moviegoer will go to movie j
with characteristics Xj and expected quality Em(qj|cj, Xj), at ticket price γ14 is15
p(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = P (U(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) > 0)
= P (j > γ − αEm(qj|cj, Xj)− βXj)
=
exp (αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − γ)
exp (αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − γ) + exp(0)
=
1
1 + exp (γ − αEm(qj|cj, Xj)− βXj) . (3)
12This general approach has also been used in previous studies of limited rationality. See Goldfarb and Yang (2009)
and Goldfarb and Xiao (in press), though all only studied producer behavior.
13This is without loss of generality because a constant term is included in the revenue regression, which in this
model is equivalent to the estimated utility of not going to the movie.
14The term γ is fixed at the average US ticket price in 2005, $6.71 (recall box office revenues are in 2005 dollars).
15Note that this formalization is a single variable logit and not a multinomial one. We do not assume that a movie-
goer can only go to one movie in this period. We make this decision because it is not clear whether movies crowd-out
other movies at the theater or have positive spillover effects. The sign on our initial regression for the competition
term (see table 2) suggests that if anything the latter explanation is more likely. Given these facts and that our esti-
mation period is the opening weekend, and the widely-released movies usually are released no more than 4 at a time,
diversified over genre, we do not find the crowding out explanation plausible enough to warrant using a multinomial
logit.
16
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We use a representative-agent approach to model moviegoers. We assume p(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj))
is the total share of moviegoers that go to movie j.16 We define the constant M as the maximum
amount of box office revenue that could be earned in the period if every moviegoer went to a movie.
Then we can define expected revenue as
R¯ (cj, Xj, qj) = Mp (Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = M
1 + exp (γ − αEm(qj|cj, Xj)− βXj) . (4)
Movie studios make decisions whether to screen movies for critics based on their expected
revenues (equation (4)). Studios also have idiosyncratic error term, υj , about the additional success
of the movie if it is cold opened. As with the moviegoer error term, υj is private information to
studios and independently and identically logistically distributed. Studios will cold open a movie
if R¯ (1, Xj, qj) + υj > R¯ (0, Xj, qj). The probability that a studio will cold open movie j given its
characteristics, Xj , and quality, qj is
pi(Xj, qj) = P
[
υj < R¯ (0, Xj, qj)− R¯ (1, Xj, qj)
]
=
exp
[
R¯ (1, Xj, qj)
]
exp
[
R¯ (1, Xj, qj)
]
+ exp
[
(R¯ (0, Xj, qj)
]
=
1
1 + exp
[
R¯ (1, Xj, qj)− R¯ (0, Xj, qj)
]
=
1
1 + exp [M [p(Xj, Em(qj|1, Xj))− p(Xj, Em(qj|0, Xj)]] . (5)
The term,Em(qj|0, Xj), the expected quality of a movie that is released to critics, is determined
16We choose this approach rather than aggregating p(Xj , Em(qj |cj , Xj)) over some N to avoid arbitrarily large
precision in our observations. Since box-office numbers and studio decisions will be combined in an maximum
likelihood estimation process to estimate the parameters of this model jointly, we believed each observation should be
counted equally. If we chose to have N consumers to make up box office, we then have N times more precision on
our moviegoer data compared to studio data.
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exogenously. Because critics can write about a movie they screen as well as reveal their estimates
about quality in ways that are relatively costless (i.e., internet sites, newspapers), we assume that
if a movie is screened to critics, its quality is then perfectly known to moviegoers. We also assume
studios are aware that critics reveal their quality. Assumption 1 states that for movies screened to
critics, moviegoers have accurate perceptions of the quality of the movie, and studios have accurate
perceptions about moviegoer perceived quality.17
Assumption 1. Em[qj|0, Xj] = qj.
We make also make a simplifying assumption about moviegoer perceived quality that allows
our structural model to match our motivating example. Recall that in our disclosure example, we
went through iterations of quality (e.g., 50, 25, 12.5) without discussing other movie characteristics
(Xj). Our models will also make this assumption.
Assumption 2. Em[qj|1, Xj] does not depend on Xj . That is, Em[qj|1, Xj] ≡ Em[qj|1].
As Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) demonstrate for all disclosure games, Em[qj|1] = 0
in Nash equilibrium, as the system completely unravels.18 Our estimation techniques will use
maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters α, and β that best fit the joint system.
This estimation technique is explained in detail in section 3.2.
17Quality could also be known with noise and all results would hold if moviegoers are risk-neutral.
18Alternatively, one could consider the value Em[qj |1] to be bounded on the interval [0, 100] in a general form of
the Cursed Equilibrium model (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). We will estimate the Nash equilibrium model in this paper,
and leave the alternative specification in the appendix.
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3.1 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model for Moviegoers and Distributors
The alternative structural behavioral model which originally inspired this research, the cognitive
hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) makes a different assumption aboutEm(qj|1) than the equi-
librium restrictions in assumption 2. The behavioral model relaxes the assumption that moviegoers
go through all the iterations of strategic thinking necessary to reach the game’s Nash equilibrium
and corresponding quality estimate. Similarly, distributors may best respond to moviegoers who
have only done a limited number of steps of strategic thinking. The CH model can characterize
aggregate strategic behavior with a single parameter, τ .19
The CH model assumes that there is a population of individuals who do varying numbers of
steps of iterative strategic thinking. The parameter τ determines the distribution of steps of thinking
by the one-parameter Poisson distribution
P (x = n|τ) = τ
ne−τ
n!
(6)
where τ is the mean number of steps of strategic thinking. To develop the model similar to our
baseline, we restrict moviegoer inference of quality to not include specific movie characteristics,
by revising assumption 2.
Assumption 2′. For all k, Ekm[qj|1, Xj, τ ] does not depend on Xj . That is, Ekm[qj|1, Xj, τ ] ≡
Ekm[qj|1, τ ].
19The parsimony of the single parameter specification is the reason we have chosen this approach over using a
level-k model (see Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Crawford
and Iriberri, 2007a,b). Also, (Camerer et al., 2004) found that the Poisson restriction fit almost as well as models with
several free parameters for different level frequencies. Given that we have only box-office data and studio decisions to
cold open, we would be unable to identify the proportion of levels in the population without some type of distributional
assumption. The Poisson version of CH does give such an assumption. Other approaches are possible.
19
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Zero-level moviegoers do not think about the studio’s actions of cold opening a movie. They
act as if the movie’s quality is average E0m(qj|1, , τ) = 50.20 They will go to any movie with
probability
p
(
Xj, E
0
m(qj|1, τ)
)
=
1
1 + exp [γ − βXj − 50α] (7)
A 0-level studio will best respond to the 0-level moviegoer.21 The 0-level studio calculates the
expected revenue from cold opening a movie as
R¯0(1, Xj, qj, τ) = Mp
(
Xj, E
0
m(qj|1, τ)
)
. (8)
It will therefore cold open movie j with probability
pi0(Xj, qj, τ) =
1
1 + exp
[
Mp(Xj, qj)− R¯0(1, Xj, qj, τ)
]
=
1
1 + exp [M [p(Xj, qj)− p(Xj, 50)]] (9)
Proceeding inductively, for k > 0 moviegoers will consider the expectations of all moviegoers
of lower types (k′ < k). They will form a conditional expectation using τ of lower level types
20Assuming that 0-level players choose randomly across possible strategies is natural in many games. However,
the more appropriate, general interpretation is that 0-level players are simple, or heuristic, rather than neceessarily
random. For example, in “hide-and-seek” games a natural starting point is to choose a “focal” strategy (see Crawford
and Iriberri (2007a)). In auctions a natural starting point is to bid one’s value (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b). In our
game, random choice by moviegoers would mean random attendance at movies. That specification of 0-level play
doesn’t work well because it generates far too much box office revenue. It is admittedly not ideal to have special ad
hoc assumptions for different games. Eventually we expect there will be a theory of 0-level play that maps the game
structure and a concept of simplicity or heuristic behavior into 0-level specifications in a parsimonious way.
21An alternate specification, more in line with the spirt of experimental work, would have 0-level studios cold-open
at random. The issue with this specification is that then, both 0 and 1-level moviegoers believe cold-openings have
expected quality of 50. Depending on values of τ , this can lead to a pattern of two successive levels of moviegoers or
studios behaving in the same way, creating an identification issue. For this reason we avoid this specification. See our
working paper (Brown et al., 2009) for a specification more in line with the experimental spirit.
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and assume studios only cold-open movies with quality lower than that expectation (as in our mo-
tivating example). Their expectation about the quality of cold-opened movies will be the average
quality of movies below that threshold. Formally,
Ekm(qj|1, τ) =
∫ k−1∑
n=0
P (x=n|τ)Enm(qj |1,τ)
0
qP (q) dq
/∫ k−1∑
n=0
P (x=n|τ)Enm(qj |1,τ)
0
P (q) dq
=
1
2
k−1∑
j=0
P (x = n|τ)Ejm(qj|1, τ) (10)
Notice that (10) fits our motivating example well. A 0-level moviegoer believes cold-opened
movies have quality of 50. A 1-level moviegoer knows this fact, assumes studios will only cold-
open movies below quality of 50, and given a uniform distribution of quality infers cold-opened
movies have quality 25. A 2-level moviegoer averages 50 and 25 using τ and believes expected
quality is half this average as studios best respond to a distribution of 0 and 1-level moviegoers. A
k-level moviegoer will attend a movie using the same equation as before,
p
(
Xj, E
k
m(qj|1, τ)
)
=
1
1 + exp [γ − βXj − Ekm(qj|1, τ)α]
. (11)
For k > 0 a studio best responds to a distribution of k′ ≤ k determined by τ . Their choice to cold
open is also dependent on their movie’s specific characteristics through expected revenue. They
will calculate expected revenue using
R¯k (1, Xj, qj, τ) =
M
P (x < k|τ)
k∑
n=0
P (x = n|τ) p (Xj, Enm(qj|1, τ)) . (12)
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This leads to k-level, movie-specific, probability of cold opening,
pik(Xj, qj, τ) =
1
1 + exp
[
Mp(Xj, qj)− R¯k (1, Xj, qj, τ)
] . (13)
As an example, table 4 shows values for the first ten steps of thinking for a cold-opened movie,
When a Stranger Calls, when τm = 1.638 and 100. Moviegoers’ inference is determined by (10).
They make a decision whether to go to the movie from (11) which determines the proportion of
moviegoers that attend. A k-level studio best responds to a distribution of moviegoers k′ ≤ k.
Since they know the quality of their movie they make a decision about whether to cold open by
comparing the expected revenues given moviegoers’ inferred quality (conditional on a cold open
choice) and the true quality, and including an idiosyncratic error term (to model stochastic choice).
Notice that the values of inferred quality are the same for all movies given the steps of thinking
(they do not depend on Xj by assumption 2′), but the proportion of moviegoers that see the movie
and the cold-opening probabilities depend on Xj so those values are unique to this movie.
3.2 Estimation
Before the estimation procedure is explained, a few of the numbers used in the process must be
clarified. The logic of the model and our data (see section 2 and table 2) suggest that cold opening
most strongly affects the first weekend’s revenue (which may then affect cumulative revenue).
Therefore, we use the first weekend’s revenue to calibrate the models’ revenue equations and studio
decisions. Thus, our representation of revenue, R (Xj, Em(cj, Xj)), will use weekend box office
revenue normalized to 2005 dollars. Movie ticket prices are also in 2005 dollars. The value M , the
maximum possible box office, is chosen as double the highest weekend gross over the set being
22
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Table 4: Moviegoer inferred quality and predicted attendance by level of thinking for When a
Stranger Calls at τm = τs = 1.638.
a. Inferred quality by levels of thinking is the same for all movies. By assumption, it does not depend on Xj .
b. Moviegoer attendance and probability of cold-opening do depend on Xj , so these values are specific to this movie.
evaluated.22 Movie quality, qj is the standardized version of the average metacritic rating used in
section 2. Movie characteristics Xj are the independent variables used in the initial regressions
on weekend box office in section 2, excluding cold opening and critic rating. The term cj has the
same value as the cold dummy in section 2.
We jointly estimate the parameters using box office revenue data and studio-cold-opening de-
cisions in a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Equation 4 which represents the expected
box office revenue in our model is non-linear and requires a transformation to fit a linear model.
We estimate the model equation with movie specific error term ξj which is normally distributed,
N(0, σ). That is,
log
(
M
R (Xj, Em(cj, Xj))
− 1
)
+ γ = αEm(qj|cj) + βXj + ξj (14)
22For 2000-2005, M = 249.46, for 2006-2009, M = 283.82.
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Denoting the residuals of this linear model as e, we have a log likelihood function,
Lm(α, β) = −n
2
log(2piσ2) +
(
− 1
2σ2
e′e
)
(15)
Since σ2 is unknown it will be estimated by e
′e
N−Q where N is the number of movies and Q are the
number of movie characteristics including quality.23
The log likelihood for the studio decisions is calculated using the estimated predicted proba-
bilities of cold opening. For each set of parameter values, there is a predicted probability that a
cold-opened movie would have been cold opened (pi(Xj, qj)). Similarly, for each set of parame-
ter values, there is a predicted probability a movie that was screened for critics would have been
screened for critics (1− pi(Xj, qj)). The studio log likelihood function is the product of these
values, logged.
Ls(α, β) =
∑
j∈N
log (cjpi(Xj, qj) + (1− cj)(1− pi(Xj, qj))) (16)
The partial log likelihoods are summed to form a likelihood function that incorporates both box-
office revenue and studio decisions. Estimates for the parameters in the model are obtained by
maximizing the function L(α, β) defined by equation 17.
L(α, β) = Lm(α, β) + Ls(α, β) (17)
23The constant Q = 24 for the 23 movie characteristics plus critic rating. For 2000-2005 data N = 778, for
2006-2009 data N = 558.
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For a given set of values, (β, α),24 are both put into (15) and (16) and logged, and then summed
to get a likelihood value in equation (17). Maximum likelihood parameter estimates, (α∗, β∗)
are obtained using an optimization algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965) that begins at the origin.
Standard errors of all coefficients are obtained by 100 random bootstraps of the data set using the
same algorithm. For the bootstraps the algorithm is started at the parameter estimates (α∗, β∗)
instead of the origin.
The CH model uses the same basic maximum likelihood estimation procedure as the standard
model. The difference is the addition of the parameter τ . Because moviegoers and studios are
different types of players with different objective functions and levels of experience, the two types
of players are allowed to have differing τ parameters. Moviegoers have parameter τm and studios
have parameter τs.25 This will allow us to infer whether the degree of limited thinking by both
studios and moviegoers are similar (i.e., if τm ≈ τs).
As with the standard model, we jointly estimate the parameters of the CH model. For a given
set of values (α, β, τm, τs) where τm, τs ≥ 0, α, β, and τm are used to compute the expected box
office of cold opened (those where cj = 1) movies.26,27
24An alternate baseline specification treats E(qj |1) as a free parameter instead of setting it to 0, see appendix for
the results of that specification.
25An alternative approach would be have only one τ for moviegoer and studio behavior and jointly estimate it based
on studio decisions and box office data. The trouble with approach is that because cold-opening occurs so infrequently,
the number of observations that determine the studio’s parameter τs are roughly ten times as great as the number of
observations that determine moviegoers’ behavior τm. For this reason any joint estimation of this type will be highly
biased toward studio behavior (which already resembles the standard model), and neglect the cold-opening premium,
the primary motivation for this exercise.
26In all estimations, for a given parameter value τ equations (18) and (13) are approximated up to the level k = 100.
All probability for values k > 100 was assigned to k = 100. A τ value of 100, the upper limit, was an entire
distribution of 100-level thinkers.
27To allow an identical maximum likelihood estimation procedure with the baseline model, this value is converted
into a single quality dimension, qˆ, such that
R¯ (0, Xj , qˆ) = lim
k→∞
R¯k (1, Xj , qj , τm) . (18)
25
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The parameters α, β, and τs are then used to compute the probability of each movie being cold
opened using equation (13). Those values are put into equation (16) to compute the other partial
log likelihood. The values are then logged and summed to give a full maximum likelihood value
for the parameter values (α, β, τm, τs). Maximum likelihood parameter estimates, (α∗, β∗, τ ∗m, τ
∗
s )
are obtained using a Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm that begins at the origin. Standard errors
of all coefficients are obtained by 100 random bootstraps of the data set using the same algorithm.
For the bootstraps the algorithm is started at the parameter estimates (α∗, β∗, τ ∗m, τ
∗
s ) instead of the
origin. The results of both estimations are given in the next section.
4 Structural Estimation Results
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of both baseline and CH models separated over the
periods 2000–2005 and 2006–2009. For studio choices, the baseline equilibrium model (columns
1–2) with Em(qj|1) ≡ 0 predicts a general reluctance of studios to cold-open movies (only 11% in
2000–2005) but it is forced to use idiosyncratic error to explain the times studios do cold open.28
The CH model with best fitting τs = 100, the upper bound, for 2000–2005 (column 3) and τs =
5.022, for 2006–2009 (column 4) (values much higher than what is typically observed in laboratory
studies) can also account for the low rate of cold openings.
The one parameter for which the models differ is, importantly, the predicted cold premium. In
Basically, qˆ functions as the single value of expected quality that would generate the same expected revenue as the
CH model with parameter τm. This value is used for all cold opened movies, and qj is used for all regularly released
movies, to calculate the partial log likelihood in equation (15).
28Table 4 assumes Em(qj |1) = 0. However, if that conditional expectation is a free parameter, the best-fitting
values are 0 and 9.12 in the two time periods (see web appendix for that model). The log likelihood in the later period
is -673.79, only two points better than the restricted model, and the predicted cold premium is -.054 (.015), so the
restriction Em(qj |1) = 0 is not producing the poor premium prediction.
26
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Table 5: Parameter estimates for jointly estimated baseline and CH models by time period, using
weekend box office revenue and cold-opening decisions data.
Tables displaying coefficients for all regressors are available in the appendix. Standard errors are calculated from 100
bootstraps for each model and time period. a. Actual values: 13.47, 24.49. b. Actual values: 0.055, 0.181. c. Actual
values: 0.059, 0.301.
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the baseline model movies are cold opened only due to studio idiosyncratic error, and moviegoers
think their quality is 0. This means, provided movie quality is above 0, that those movies should
make less box-office revenue than if they had been screened for critics (i.e., the predicted box
office premium is negative). The baseline model’s predictions reflect this effect, predicting that
the average cold-opened movie should do 10.1% and 7.5% worse in 2000–2005 (column 1) and
2006–2009 (column 2), respectively. The CH model parameterizes moviegoers as relatively naı¨ve,
they do on average 1.636 (column 3) and 0.00 (column 4) steps of thinking in each of the two
periods. This is equivalent to an expected quality (Em(qj|1)) of 25.313 and 50.000, respectively.
Since the cold-opened movies usually have qualities below these values, there is a positive cold-
opening premium of 10.5% and 17.7% in each period, as moviegoers overestimate the quality of
cold-opened movies. The CH predictions are therefore closer to actual cold-opening premiums of
5.9% and 30.1%.
It is true that the log likelihood is only slightly better for CH than for the baseline model.
However, the only difference in fit comes from explaining a small percentage of cold openings
(around 10%) and a modest premium (around 20%). Furthermore, the baseline model clearly
misestimates the sign of the box office premium, so while the overall fit is not bad, the adequate fit
comes from an idiosyncratic error explanation that gets the economics wrong. And, the difference
in explanatory power does increase between CH and baseline from 2000–2005 to 2006–2009 as the
frequency of cold openings increases (5.53% vs. 18.1%) (the log likelihoods are -676 and -664).
Note that because of the Em(qj|1) = 0 assumption, in this particular baseline model movie-
goers do not have correct Bayesian expectation of cold-opened quality. Moviegoers believe cold-
opened movies have quality of 0, when in fact they have average quality of 19.17 and 29.98 due
to studio idiosyncratic error. However, such a model which uses these correct expectations (see
28
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appendix) has log likelihood values of -1150 and -828 for two respective periods, much worse than
the table 4 baseline or CH model fits.
In general, the estimated τ values for moviegoer behavior are much closer to those observed
in laboratory experiments than the studio estimates. The value 1.638 is close to other experi-
mental estimates (generally around 1–2.5). The estimated value of 0 for 2006-2009 implies a
pure naı¨vete´, not usually found in experimental data (see Camerer et al. (2004) and O¨stling et al.,
(2011)). However, the low value may be more understandable because 0 and 1-level moviegoers
behave identically (see footnote 21), so the fitted 0-level play may be capturing 0-level play as
well. Studio estimates suggest Nash play in 2000-2005 (high estimated τs) and a high number of
steps of thinking in 2006-2009 (high estimated τs). Since studio executives making the decision
to cold open think a great deal about their strategy, and have experience in these decisions (i.e.,
they are not new to these games), their higher sophistication compared to moviegoers may make
some sense. At the same time, the value of 5.02 instead of 100 in the second time period suggests
studios may be learning that moviegoers are more naı¨ve than they thought in 2000-2005.
5 Conclusion
This paper is the first to apply a parametrized behavioral model to a game of disclosure in the
field, an example of “structural behavioral economics.” We study a market in which information
senders (movie studios) are strategically withholding information (the quality of their movie) from
information receivers (moviegoers), by not showing movies to critics in time for reviews to be
published before opening weekends. Contrary to the simple Nash equilibrium, there is a “box office
premium”—cold-opened movies earn more than screened movies with similar characteristics.
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We provide two structural models to explain the environment being studied. The baseline
model has moviegoers expect cold openings to have the worst possible quality, and critics to cold-
open entirely though idiosyncratic error. The CH model with a low number of thinking steps
τm to represent moviegoer naı¨vete´, and a high τs to represent studio over-sophistication has the
same general qualities of the baseline model but is also able to predict the cold-opening premium.
Further, the best-fitting τm values for moviegeors, derived from box office data, are relatively
similar to those observed in laboratory studies. The studio’s τs are much closer to Nash levels than
those observed in laboratory experiments, but the shift of values from 2000–2005 to 2006–2009
suggests that studios may be learning to better respond to relatively naı¨ve moviegoers.
The question remains why moviegoers have become more naı¨ve about cold-openings and ap-
pear to be regressing rather than learning. Cold openings appear to have increased in profitability
in the later part of the decade, suggesting if anything consumers are inferring less about their
quality than before. While factors like repeated play and reputation of studios may explain the
reluctance of studios to cold-open, the continued naı¨vete´ of moviegoers is difficult for standard
game-theoretic models to explain.29 One explanation we prefer, though cannot prove, concerns the
population of moviegoers. A third of tickets are sold to young moviegoers (age 12-24) (MPAA,
2010). While moviegoers might learn over time that cold-opened movies are surprisingly bad, the
market has overlapping generations. New, naı¨ve moviegoers are always entering the population;
there is no reason to expect rapid convergence of beliefs across such a population. Of course,
this explanation is just speculation, and it is an open research topic to determine the dynamics of
relatively young consumer populations.
29Economic intuition and experiments on lemons (e.g. Lynch et al., 2001) suggest consumers will ultimately infer
that goods whose quality is not disclosed have low quality.
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This paper has connected a major area of economics and management research, models of
limited strategic thinking, with a major area of economic research, games of selective disclosure.
From a management perspective, companies may have some intuitions that it can be advantageous
to selectively withhold bad quality information, not strictly following the equilibrium analysis of
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) (see Brown et al. (2009) for examples). However, this
paper begins to uncover what level of bad information should be withheld, and can help explain
why. We find that in the movie industry, it appears that studios are withholding too little, although
they appear to be learning quickly. While the industry studied here, major movie studios, is quite
unique, the main parts of the industry—products of unknown quality and critical review—are
found in other industries. Moreover, many industries involve concentrated sellers than can learn to
withhold and diffuse rotating consumers that will likely have difficulty learning. This suggests our
approach could be applied to other industries: models of strategic thinking could be used in any
industry that involves disclosure to examine what level of disclosure is optimal for managers given
the limited strategic thinking of consumers.
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Appendices: Not for Publication
A Description of Variables
To determine if a movie was cold opened (cj = 1) we examined the dates on three or four major
news publications (the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and New
York Post). If the dates of reviews in any of these publications were later than the release date, we
examined the reasoning behind the late reviews. A movie was classified a “cold open” if at least
one source stated the movie was not screened for critics before release (in most cases, none of the
available sources had advance reviews).
Weekend and total US box office data as well as total box office data for international markets
for movies from January 2000-June 2006 were obtained from a FilmSource database (Nielsen EDI,
www.filmsource.com). The FilmSource database also included the number of theaters that showed
a movie during its first weekend, the number of days in the opening weekend, and if the movie
was released before Friday (generally only for anticipated blockbusters). FilmSource also gave a
description of the genre of the movie, its MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, R), and whether the movie
was adapted from previous source material. After June 2006 these values were obtained from the
pro service of IMDB.com and boxofficemojo.com. All rental numbers were obtained from these
two sites.
Production budget information came from IMDB.com for most movies, and from boxoffice-
mojo.com or the-numbers.com for those missing from IMDB.com. Budget data were available for
1313 of the 1414 movies, including 138 or the 163 cold openings (85%).
The pro version of the IMDB.com database was used to determine the star power rating of each
1
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movie’s stars. Each week IMDB.com determined this value by ranking the number of searches
done on the IMDB.com site for every person affiliated with movies. The most searched star would
have value 1. Since there are over one million stars on IMDB.com, we took the natural logarithm
of the star ranking to reduce the effect of unknown stars with very high numbers. We averaged the
logged star ranking for the top two stars for each movie during its opening week.
Three other variables, competition (the average production budget of other movies released
on the same opening weekend), the summer dummy variable (whether the movie was released in
June, July and August),30 and the year of release variable (2000=-3, 2001=-2, 2002=-1, 2003=0,
2004=1, 2005=2, 2006=3, 2007=4, 2008=5, 2009=6) were calculated from the previous data.31
Advertising expenditures were obtained from the ad$ spender print resources for advertising
before 2007, and from the ad$ spender database for advertising after 2007.
CPI data was obtained for the US, Mexico and United Kingdom from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
B List of movies cold-opened movies included in our dataset
Table A.1 provides a list of each of the 138 cold-opened movies in our dataset and date of release.
30Adding specific dummy variables for each month instead of a summer dummy generally has little effect on our
regressions. The results for the 2006-2009 and all years remain unchanged. The significance for the cold term in the
2000-2005 decreases for both cumulative and weekend regression, but this may be due to the fact that there are only
43 cold openings in that period and 23 dummy variables.
31The regressions had similar results when dummy variables for year were used instead of one year variable.
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Table A.1: List of cold openings
3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2126774
C Additional Tables
Tables A.2 and A.3 provide full regression results for the regressions used in the paper as well as an
alternative specification which only includes the variables found to be significantly correlated with
box office revenue. Table A.4 shows the results of the regression that determined the propensity
score matching results used in this paper. Table A.5 provides the results of different propensity
score matching specifications on movies from the years 2000–2005. Table A.6 provides the results
of different propensity score matching specifications on movies from the years 2006–2009. Table
A.7 displays all parameter estimates for four different specifications of our models.
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Table A.2: Regressions on logged weekend box office revenues (in millions)
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Table A.3: Regressions of logged total box office revenues (in millions)
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Table A.4: Logistic regression on cold opening of independent variables
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Table A.5: Propensity score matching results for logged US cumulative and weekend box office,
2000-2005. Cold opening is the treatment variable. A logit regression including all 23 variables
and a constant (see table A.4) was used to generate propensity scores. All specifications are over
the area of common support.
Table A.6: Propensity score matching results for logged US cumulative and weekend box office,
2006-2009. Cold opening is the treatment variable. A logit regression including all 23 variables
and a constant (see table A.4) was used to generate propensity scores. All specifications are over
the area of common support.
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Table A.7: Parameter estimates for jointly estimated baseline, baseline with correct Bayesian ex-
pectations, baseline with free Em(qj|1) parameter, and cognitive hierarchy models by time period,
using weekend box office revenue and cold-opening decisions data. Standard errors are calculated
from 100 bootstraps for each model and time period.
a. Actual values: 13.47, 24.49. b. Actual values: 0.055, 0.181. c. Actual values: 0.059, 0.301
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